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ELECTORAL

REVISION

IN

JAPAN--1982

Ray Christensen*
Introduction and Theoretical Framework
The revision of an election system is one of
the touchiest issues in a western-style democracy.
Every politician knows that a proposed reapportionment scheme might
affect his chances for
reelection.
Thus, many accuse politicians of not
considering the merits of a revision proposal, but
only the personal consequences. This phenomenon
is seen at regular 10-year intervals in the United
States.
With each new census, some states are
required to redraw their congressional district
boundaries, and, invariably, some of the disputes
that ensue have to be settled by the courts or a
nonpartisan panel. This kind of action is by no
means limited to state governments.
In many
foreign countries which have a democratic form of
government, attempts to revise the election 3ystem
have sparked fierce debates.
One of the most
recent of these debates, concerning a 1982 revision
of the Public Offices Election Law in Japan, will be
the subject of this research.
A theory by Maurice Duverger will be used to
explain politicians' behavior regarding this bill.
He says:
The notion that politics is both a conflict
between individuals and groups for the
acquisition of power, which the victors
use to their advantage at the expense of

*Ray is a senior majoring in International
Relations and in Japanese.
He will be attending
Harvard Law School this fall.

PI SIGMA ALPHA REVIEW

2

the vanquished and an attempt to establish a social order beneficial to all
constitutes the b::r.sis of our theory of
political sociology.
He continues:
The primary objective of parties is to
acquire power or a §>hare in the exercise
of power; they seek to win seats at
elections, to name deputies and ministers, 2 and to take control of government.
As Duverger suggests, people often think
that politicians are motivated solely by a desire for
power.
It will be shown that the positions
Japanese politicians took regarding the 1982 revision bill were determined by whether or not the
politician and his party would benefit from the
proposed changes.
Duverger's ideas have been expressed and
examined in other situations by many other
political scientists.
Lorimer says that because
election boundaries help determine who gets
elected, discussions about redrawing boundarie~
become an item of utmost concern to politicians.
In Lightbody's analysis of revision in the municipal
election system of Winnipeg, Canada in the 1920s,
he describes the proposal worked out between the
conservative Citizens' League and the opposition
Labor party as a compromise where each party
lobbied for t,pe adoption of proposals that would
benefit them.
More recently, Choi claims that the adoption
of multi-member districts in South Korean elections
was merely an attempt by the government party to
give their urban candidates a chance to be elected.
Under the former system of single-member
districts, the government party often came in
second to the opposition party. However, with
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two candidates being chosen from each district ,
the government party now holds 5 roughly half of
the urban seats in the legislature.
Another example of this phenomenon can be
seen in the initial adoption of proportional representation (PR) in Switzerland, an appropriate
example because the change debated in Japan in
1982 was whether or not to adopt a PR system of
election in the National Constituency of the House
of Councillors.
In the Swiss canton of Techino,
an unfair election system allowed the conservative
party to get 75 percent of the seats in the legislature with only 50 percent of the vote. The opposition Freedom party, who also got 50 percent of
the vote, demanded adoption of a PR system where
50 percent of the vote would translate into 50
percent of the seats.
The conservative party
refused to negotiate on their demands.
After a
rebellion in which the opposition took all government leaders hostage and took control of government buildings, the conservatives gave in and set
up a PR system of election. Clearly, the conservatives were unwilling to change an obviously
unfair system that benefited them un til riots
demonstrated that continued intransigence would be
more harmful to their ffelf-interest than the adoption of the PR system.
To see how Duverger's theory, as illustrated
in these case studies, works in the context of
Japanese politics, it is first necessary to understand cultural differences that affect decisionmaking in Japan. Japanese society places a much
greater value on the preservation of group harmony and consensus than do traditional western
democracies.
Nakane finds this emphasis on
consensus throughout Japanese society, begin~ing
with decisions made in the local village council.
Ward contrasts the U. S. system based on
open competition in which the majority wins with
the Japanese system where a simple majority is
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not sufficient; a consensus is achieved where
"face" and harmony (Le., no open contention) are
preserved at all costs. He further explains that
even with the adoption of western democratic institu tions, traditional Japanese decision -making has
only been masked.
Compromises are worked out
beforehaIgd and the Diet unanimously approves the
decision.
Existing System Needed Change
Japan's basic election system was set up in
1947 as a part of the new postwar constitution.
However, that system was modeled after the prewar system that first came into being as a part of
~he Meiji Constitution promulgated in 1890.
Both
constitutions gave Japan a bicameral legislature.
The Lower House was called the House of Representatives, currently consisting of 511 members
whose term of office is four years or less if the
Prime Minister calls for an election or is toppled
by a no-confidence vote.
The members of the
Lower House are each elected from medium-sized
local districts (three to five elected from each
district) . By contrast, the Upper House or House
of Councillors is a 252-member body where each
councillor is elected for six years with half of the
members up for election every third year.
The
members of the Upper House come from two types
of constituencies. One hundred of the 252 members are elected at large (National Constituency),
and the remaining 152 members are elected in local
two- to eight-member districts--similar to the
Lower House election districts.
There are three aspects of this election
system that are important when considering election revision.
First is the National Constituency
of the Upper House which was meant to be "a
council of cool geason to exercise restraint on the
Lower House."
The framers of Japan's postwar
constitution thought that the National Constituency
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would attO'act talented people who were above party
politics.
Second, the postwar politicians also
placed very stringent restrictions on campaign
expenditures, the length of the campaign period
and what types of election activities would be
permitted. Third, they assigned to each district
the number of representatives proportional to that
district's population, but they failed to include any
provision
for
revising
their
distribution
in
response to population shifts.
These three specifics of the 1950 Public
Offices Election Law were the roots of problems
that have sincd developed in the Japanese electoral
system.
First, the National Constituency has
attracted so-called "talent" candidates
(movie
stars, TV personalit~es and famous athletes) as
opposed to the high quality elites that the law was
meant to attract.
These "talent" candidates are
elected because they have enough popularity
nationwide to garner the votes sufficient for
election. Though the political parties would rather
have party regulars in those seats, they make use
of the political reality by recruiiipg these "talent"
candidates to run on their slate.
The second problem inherent in this sYbtem is
that even though campaign spending is severely
limited, campaign costs have skyrocketed. Oikawa
estimates that in National Constituency elections, a
candidate can be expected to spend two million
dollars, and in the general election of 1974, called
the "plutocratic election," thf2 majority party spent
a total of 120 million dollars.
Though campaign expenditure laws are on the
books, they are, as a matter of course, ignored
by almost all candidates. Why this is done can be
understood by looking at the National Constituency
races.
A candidate is allowed to spend approximately 110,000 dollars (27 million yen), but this
limit would be exceeded if he only P,!S up the
100,000 posters allowed by the same law.

6
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The third problem is that population has
shifted, causing a serious imbalance in the apportionment of seats across the nation. An example
of this shift is the election of Nishimura Shoji to
an Upper House seat from rural Tottori prefecture.
In Nishimura's sparsely populated district, he was
elected with only 163,450 votes; however, in other
more populous districts 41 candidates failed to be
elected, even though they had more votes than
Nishimura. The extreme case was a candidate from
metropolitan Osaka who received 6321~22 votes and
came in fourth in a three-man race.
This problem of malapportionment is not as bad as in Great
Britain where the ratio of difference between the
largest and the smallest districts is 10 to 1 or in
the U. S. where the ratio between lfe largest and
smallest Senate districts is 62 to 1.
Although the malapportionment ratio among
the election districts in Japan is less than that in
the U. S. Senate districts, malapportionment is a
problem because, unlike the U. S. Senate, the
seats in Japan are supposed to be evenly
distributed.
The opposition parties continually
bring up this issue, and the Supreme Court (as
recently as April 27, 1983) continues to rule that
the districts should be reapportioned.
However,
the court also rules that reapportionment is a
legislative flftter and not in their area of
jurisdiction.
This ruling has produced the
curious phenomenon in which all parties agree that
reapportionment is necessary but no action is
taken because the two largest parties would lose
seats in any reapportionmeni 7 scheme that would
rectify the current imbalance.
With a knowledge of the major problems in the
Japanese electoral system, it becomes necessary to
understand the situation of each political party in
order to see how each party's position affected
that party's stand on election revision proposals.
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Currently there are five major parties in
Japan.
Two are national parties which receive
most of their support from rural areas, and the
other three are largely phenomena of the metropolitan areas. The largest party is the conservative Liberal Democratic party (LDP), which has
ruled :dfpan under one name or another since
WW II.
In the 1983 elections, the LDP's share of
the vote varied fl~m 60 to 70 percent in 10 largely
rural prefectures
to 20 percent in Tokyo, Osaka
and ~8kohama, the three largest metropolitan
areas.
The LDP maintains its parliamentary
majority by sweeping most of the rural districts.
However, they also have considerable voting
strength in metropolitan and semiurban areas,
which makes the LDP a national party.
The second largest party, with about half the
votes the LDP receives, is the Japan Socialist
party (JSP), the only other national party.
In
the same 1983 election, the JSP's share of the vote
was similar to the Ii1P's in that the JSP did best
in rural prefectures
and did worst in Tokyo and
Osaka.
As mentioned earlier, one can see why these
two parties would oppose any reapportionment plan
that would dilute the unrealistic electoral streng·th
of the rural prefectures. Both the LDP and the
JSP g'ain much of their support from these areas
as opposed to the other political parties which are
based in the metropolitan areas.
The other parties are the Democratic Socialist
party (DSP), Japan Communist party (JCP) and
Komeito. These three parties take a combined vote
of 35 to 45 percent; however, because of the
election system and malapportionment, they only
recei~2
about 25 percent of the seats in the
Diet.
In addition to these five parties, there
are other minor parties, such as the New Liberal
Club (NLC), which are trying to gain status as
major parties.
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Electoral Revision Attempts
That Have Failed

Just as it is necessary to understand the
pre-revIsIOn electoral system and situation in
Japan, so also is it necessary to see what other
election revisions have been attempted and why
they were not passed.
Although proposals to revise some part of the
election system are discussed in nearly every Diet
session, the first major postwar revision attempt
was made by Prime Minister Hatoyama (LDP) in
1956. His proposal was basically to change Japan
from multi-member electoral districts to singlemember districts as have the United States and
Great Britain. Hrebenar estimates that under such
a system the LDP wo~ have taken 89 percent of
the seats in the Diet.
It appears that Hatoyama
was using the guise of election revision to further
strengthen the LDP. Although the LDP had ample
votes to pass such a revision (t11z¥ had 63 percent
of the seats in the Diet in 1956),
they tabled the
measure in the face of a united opposition which
threatened 2So block passage of other important
legislation.
This decision is a good example of the Japanese desire for consensus. Because the opposition
parties refused to negotiate on any revision that
would weaken their position in the Diet, the LDP
preserved consensus by tabling its proposition. If
the LDP had insisted on passing the bill, the
opposition would most likely have boycotted Diet
sessions and resorted to various parliamentary
measures to slow down legislation.
In such a
situation the LDP would have been painted as
dictators and would probably have lost much of
their support among the Japanese people. Above
all else, harmony must be maintained.
This same revision proposal showed up with
slight variations throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
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The most significant variation was the inclusion of
a PR system of election in the proposal put forth
by Prime lVlinister Kakuei Tanaka.
Though a PR
system had been proposed in the 1966 and 1976
LDP Election Research Council reports, Tanaka was
the first to include it in a formal revision proposal.
Tanaka suggested the following:
first,
change all districts to one-member districts (same
as the Hatoyama plan); second, implement a PR
system to elect some of the Lower House members;
third, change the National Constituency of the
Upper House to a PR method of election.
The significance of this proposal was that a
few concessions were made to the opposition parties. The inclusion of a PR system of election in
part of the Upper and Lower House elections meant
that if Komeito took 10 percent of the vote, they
would get 10 percent of the seats in the PR constituencies.
However, the change to singlemember districts for the other seats would virtually wipe out opposition representation in those
seats.
The strategy behind this new proposal is easy
to see. Thayer says the LDP included PR only as
a means
attract opposition party support for the
proposal.
The LDP politicians were not dumb;
they knew that even though they conceded some
advantage by including a PR system, they would
still improve their overall position.
Hrebenar
estimates that under the Tanaka proposal the LDP
would have 2~ained 78.9 percent of the Lower
House seats.
In addition to gaining Lower House
seats, the LDP would improve its position in the
Upper House by changing the National Constituency to a PR system.
Why the LDP thought it
necessary to revise the National Constituency can
be seen in Hrebenal"s statement that the National
Constituency was one of the few part~80f the
election system that did not help the LDP.

tz£
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The reaction to such a thinly disg'uised
partisan proposal is easy to imagine. The opposition called the plan a "Kakumander," a play on
words combinin~9gerrymander with Tanaka's first
name (Kakuei).
Since the plan would only
weaken their positions, 3tfe opposition parties
obstructed Diet operations
which forced Tanaka
to abandon his proposal. Stockwin calls Tanaka's
abandonment of h:m. proposal "an unusual and
stunning reversal."
He calls it this because the
LDP, with its parliamentary majority, can usually
negotiate and gain the necessary consensus for
passage of its proposals. But since this revision
threatened the life of many of the other parties,
there was no room for negotiation. Clearly, each
Diet member based his decision on Tanaka's proposal on whether or not it would help his party or
himself.
Even within the LDP there was opposition to
Tanaka's proposal. Many established Diet members
had built up extensive support organizations in
their districts, and the prospect of their election
districts being cut up into smaller districts meant
that a candidate would be cut off from many
former areas of support. As the newspaper Asahi
Shimbun commented, the stand a Diet member
would take on this proposal could be easily determined
looking at conditions in his electoral
district.

b.f2

Both reVISIon attempts failed because in a
system that puts so much priority on consensus,
the opposition would never accept the heavyhanded attempts by the LDP to improve its own
position.
The LDP could have forced the bill
through with parliamentary majority. Such action,
however, would have hurt the LDP's public image.
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Successful Revision Attempts
In contrast to the proposals that failed, there
are three election reVISIOns that were passed
during this same period.
By looking briefly at
these three revisions, one can see that in order to
secure the necessary consensus for passage, a bill
must clearly benefit the parties from which support
is needed.
Twice the LDP has skirted the reapportionment issue by increasing the size of the Diet and
adding seats to urban constituencies (1976 and
1967). These two bills were successful for three
reasons. First, there was no attempt to decrease
rural seats. Such an attempt would have been met
with immediate opposition from the LDP and JSP
who rely on rural support. Second, the metropolitan-based opposition parties supported this measure because it gave them a chance to elect more
Diet members. Third, the LDP also benefited.
How was this revision beneficial to the LDP?
Since the law requires that Lower House districts
have from three to five seats and most urban
districts already had four or five seats, the addition of one or two new seats resulted in the splitting of ~ch district into two new three-member
districts.
Also, since the LDP takes 20 percent
of the vote in metropolitan areas, the LDP almost
always takes one seat in each metropolitan district.
One seat in a four-member district is only 25 percent of the seats, but one seat in each of two new
three-member districts adds up to 33 percent of
the seats. At the same time the opposition parties
increase their strength with four in place of three
possible seats.
It is clear that the LDP drew up a proposal
that appealed to its selfish interests as well as
those of the opposition, and by so doing consensus
was achieved and the bills were passed.

12

PI SIGMA ALPHA REVIEW

The third example of a bill passed with the
necessary consensus is the 1975 revision of the
Public Offices Election Law. This revision of laws
governing campaign financing activities came on
the heels of the 1974 "plutocratic election." The
election was called this because of the high level
of spending that occurred.
Public opinion demanded that something be done, so the LDP, with
the cooperation of the DSP and JSP, drew up a
law that Hrebenar describes as accomplishing
nothing "except to legitimize the traditional sources
of funds and give the incorrect impressio~Jhat the
entire process had been
reformed."
One
interesting point of the bill was that it prohibited
the distribution of party literature at train stations
and department stores. Hrebenar sees this as an
LDP-JSP alliance to restrict the campaign activities
of the JCP and Komeito, both of which are based
on large volunteer organizations (the Communist
party and a lay Buddhist organization respectively); on the other hand, the LDP and JSP do not
have similar organizations to rely on. As could be
predicted from Duverger's theory, the only major
parties that opposed the 1975 revision were the
JCP and Komeito.
By
comparing
these
successful
reVISIon
attempts it can be seen that certain qualities are
necessary for an election revision bill to become
law in Japan. First, the supporters of a bill must
have more than just a simple majority; a certain
level of consensus is needed before a bill can be
passed.
Nakane, in her discussion of village
decision-making, draws the bottom line at 70 percent. She says that when 70 percent of a group
agrees, the other 30 percent will give in to preserve harmony, though th3K may maintain their
opposition to the proposal.
This behavior can·
be found in the passage of the 1975 revision bill
where the LDP-DSP-JSP coalition provided enough
consensus to override the JCP-Komeito opposition.
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Second, in order to gain that consensus, the
bill must appeal to the selfish interests of each
party whose support is needed.
Partial concessions which hurt the opposition parties' 0verall
standing will not attract those parties' support.
Revision of the Public Office
Election Law
With the lessons of Japanese election history
in mind, it becomes easier to understand the behavior of politicians with regard to the 1982 revision
of the Public Offices Election Law. The revision,
which was introduced into the Diet in May 1981,
consisted of the
following basic provisions:
(1) The 100
National Constituency councillors
would be elected nationwide as before, but instead
of voting for individual candidates, the voters
would vote for a party name. If the LDP received
40 percent of the vote in this new PR system,
then 40 percent of the 50 seats would be awarded
to the LDP. The LDP would award these 20 seats
to the top 20 candidates on their list of candidates
submitted at registration time. (2) In order for a
party to enter into the PR election, it must have
met at least one of three criteria. The party must
(one) have five current Diet members, (two) have
polled over 4 percent of the vote in the last Diet
election, or (three) have a total of at least 10
candidates registered in either the PR 01" local
districts of the Upper House election.
(3) The
registration deposit must be doubled to 16,000
dollars (4 million yen) for a candidate in the PR
election. This fee would be forfeited if the candidate loses and returned if he wins.
This new law would help all the major parties
by allowing them to cut down on campaign expenditures.
Instead of 30 candidates having to run
30 nationwide campaigns, the 30 candidates could
now concentrate on one nationwide campaign to
push the party name. On the other hand, minor

14
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parties and independents who ran only one candidate in the past would now be forced to put up
10 candidates at a cost of 160.000 dollars. Even if
the top candidate got elected. the party would still
forfeit 144.000 dollars.
Thus. un til the party
could get 4 percent of the vote or elect five
members to the Diet. the party would have to pay
144.000 dollars plus the costs of nationwide campaign each election year.
Clearly. the 1982 revision financially benefits the major parties and
appears to prohibit small parties and independents
from entering the election.
In addition to concern over finances. parties
are concerned with how the bill would affect their
strength in the Upper House.
Hrebenar claims
that the old National Constituency system puts the
LDP "at a serious disadvantage." since they "captured only 35.2 percent of these [National ConstituencY~6 seats despite gaining 44.3 percent of the
vote."
However. more recent elections (1977 and
1980) have shown the LDP doing much better in
the National Constituency. The chart below illustrates the percentage point difference between the
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percent of seats a party won and the percent of
votes a party received in each election.
By
considering only the change in the seat distribution system that a PR system would bring, it is
obvious that the JCP, DSP and Komeito would lose,
the LDP would gain, and the JSP could gain or
lose seats. A PR system would virtually eliminate
these differences between the percent of vote
received and the percent of seats received.
The introduction of a PR system would also
have another side benefit for the LDP.
In past
elections, the opposition parties had often united
and backed one candidate in districts where there
was only one seat up for election. However, with
the new PR system, each party would try to run
candidates "in as many districts ~s it could in
hopes of raising the percentage of votes the party
receives. The Japan Times notes that in the 1983
election each party was increasing the number of
candidates in the local constituency races.
Because each voter casts two ballots (one in his local
constituency and one in the National Constituency) , the parties were hoping that if a person
voted for a party's candidate in a local district,
then he would tend to vo § for the same party in
the National Constituency.
The end result would
be that cooperation among the opposition parties
would vi tu
disappear, and the LDP would face
a more splintered opposition in the local districts.

S

With a knowledge of the advantages and
disadvantages of the bill for each party, it is now
possible to look at its actual passage. The revision bill was introduced in May 1981 to the 94th
Ordinary session of the Diet, shelved during" that
session, reintroduced in October 1981 in the 95th
Extraordinary session, and finally carried over
into the 96th Ordinary session. Since Prime
Minister Suzuki had made a promise to secure
passage of the revision bill in the 96th Ordinary
session, he extended the session which was to
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end iIJ9May 1982 until August 21, a maximum of 94
days.
By July the bill was still backed up in committee, so in order to meet the August 21 deadline, the LDP, using their numerical majority,
rammed the bill out of committee. The Asahi
Shimbun says that the last bill passed through an
Upper House committee without a consensus vote
was the previous year's budget bill.
The newspaper continues that the last bill forced through
the entire Upper House by the4lfDP was the Alcohol and Tobacco Bill in 1975.
Once again the
LDP, unable to gain a consensus, was forced to
take such drastic measures (by Japanese standards) in order to secure passage of the revision
bill.
It is strange that the JSP, which would
benefit from the bill, withheld support.
This
would seem to conflict with Duverger's theory, but
actually the JSP supported the bill through its
inaction.

After the LDP forced the bill out of committee, all the opposition parties with the exception of
the JSP issued strong statements condemning the
LDP action.
But a JSP official conducted an
interview in which he said that his party resented
the fact that the LDP did everything by themselves, and thus it would be hard to call the
committee decision valid. This was a fluch milder
reaction than that of the other parties.
When the bill was up before the full body of
the Upper House, the LDP made a minor concession. Masatoshi Tokunaga, the LDP leader in the
Upper House, promised to review the proposed PR
system after two electi,fps and make any necessary
changes at that time.
With this minor concession, the JSP said they would attend the Upper
House session when the bill would be passed if one
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other party besides the LDP and JSP would also
agree to attend.
Again it is necessary to remember the Japanese desire for consensus decisions.
If all the
parties except the LDP were to have boycotted the
Diet session, then the LDP would have withdrawn
the revision bill in the face of public opposition to
the LDP's tactics. The JSP requirement that one
other party be present was a ploy by the JSP to
keep their agreement to attend the se4'3'ion from
being viewed as collusion with the LDP.
Nevertheless, the Japan Times4Fd Asahi Shim bun called
the bill an LDP-JSP bill.
It would have been politically infeasible for
the JSP to have done otherwise.
To have come
out in open support of the bill would have caused
the JSP to lose their position of leadership among
the opposition parties; yet to have opposed the bill
with boycotts, etc., would have killed the bill.
The JSP took the middle road of protesting the bill
but also attending Diet sessions.
In addition, it
got the conservative DSP to also attend, which
helped the JSP's position.

When the bill passed the Upper House, only
the LDP voted for it.
The JSP and DSP voted
against it, and the JCP, Komeito, most min~5
parties, and independents boycotted the session.
Though it could be argued that the LDP was
passing the bill without a consensus, the actual
situation was that the JSP and DSP were showing
their tacit support of the bill by their attendance.
The bill passed the Lower House and became
law on AugJf&t 18 with all major political parties in
attendance.
The LDP voted for the bill with
only the support of a minor party (NLC), and the
JSP, JCP, DSP and Komeito all voted against the
bill.
Once again this vote can be viewed as a
break in consensus, but the behavior of the

18
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parties shows that a consensus did exist.
The
lack of obstructive action on the part of the JSP
and DSP signalled to the other parties that the
JSP and DSP actually did support the bill despite
their public statements to the contrary.
In conclusion, it can be seen that for an
election proposal to be successful, a consensus
must be achieved by appealing to the selfish
interests of those parties involved. The 1982
revision bill clearly helped the LDP and JSP in
financial and electoral concerns.
The DSP, JSP
and Komeito all benefited financially but lost some
of the advantages the old National Constituency
system gave them. The DSP weighed the advantages and disadvantages and opted for tacit support. The JCP, Komeito and the independents all
viewed the bill as detrimental to their interests
and at first tried to obstruct passage by boycotting the Upper House. However, when the LDPJSP-DSP coalition became evident by the JSP-DSP
decision to attend Diet sessions, the JCP, Komeito
and the independents all gave in to the consensus
and attended the Lower House deliberations. Each
party followed its own self-interest, and because
the bill contained benefits for enough of the
parties, a consensus, albeit a tacit consensus, was
reached.
Of interest in this study is whether or not
the predicted benefits of the revision actually
occurred.
Most political analysts predicted the
following:
(1) the LDP would do better in both
the local districts and National (PR) Constituency;
(2) the number of invalid ballots would go down;
(3) the number of "talent" candidates would decrease; (4) election expenditures in the National
(PR) Constituency would go down; and (5) the
independents and minor parties would be shut out
of the National (PR) Constituency.
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The actual results were quite surprlsmg. As
expected, the LDP did better in the local districts.
The LDP polled 43.2 percent of 41he vote and
picked up four additional seats.
This good
showing by the LDP may be attributed to the
change in the electoral system or to an increase in
LDP support or to both.
In the National (PR) Constituency, the LDP
had its worst showing in postwar election history.
The party only polled 35.33 percent of the vote,
lower 48 than the previous low of 35.8 percent in
1977.
Nevertheless, the PR method of seat
allocation seems to have helped the LDP somewhat,
as can be seen on the following graph.
LDP PERFORMANCE IN NATIONAL
CONSTITUENCY ELECTIONS
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Election analysts blame the poor showing of
the LDP on a number of factors. First, in· April,
city, town and prefectural elections were held,
which traditionally hurt the LDP. Second, many
voters supported one of the many mini-partie~9that
sprang up in the National (PR) Constituency.
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It was also forecast that the number of invalid votes would increase.
Mainichi Shimbun says
this increase was one of the 55>iggest worries in
adopting the new PR system.
However, when
the votes were counted, the new election system
set a record for 5tpe lowest number of invalid
ballots since WW II.

The third prediction was that the number of
"talent" candidates would go down. Actually the
number of "talent" candidates increased f§2'm eight
to 13 when compared to the 1980 election.
The fourth prediction was that the cost of
campaigning would go down for most candidates.
Indeed, this was touted as the major reason for
implementing the PR system in the National Constituency. Mainichi Shimbun conducted a survey
of the finances of the National (PR) Constituency
candidates during the election. Fifty-one percent
of those responding replied that the election
campaign wasn't costing them anything, 40 percent
said that it was costing less than before, 6 percent said that it was costing about the same, and
3 perce~ said that it was costing more than
before.
The fifth prediction was that minor parties
and independents would be shut out from the
election process because of the strict entrance
requirements for all parties. The opposite occurred.
Various interest groups and independents
formed their own mini-parties, some of which were
successful.
There were a total of 18 political
parties which met the requirements to enter the
National Constituency election. In addition to the
regular major and minor parties, new parties
sprang up such as the Salaryman's party--Japan's
version of the tax revolt, the Welfare party-campaigning for the rights of the handicapped, the
Plebian party--headed by a self-proclaimed "gay
boy" advocating sexual liberation, and the Liberal
Party to Expel Kakuei Tanaka from Political Cir-
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cles.
In the election, the Salaryman's party
picked up two seats and the Welfare party picked
up one seat.
Two other previously established
minor parties also won one seat each.
However, it is impossible to see the long
range effects of the new PR system by looking at
only one election. B rynildsen says, "a search for
a normal Japanese election is likely to be as
unrewarding as a se~h for Utopia, Eldorado, or
the perfect Martini."
Nevertheless, the trends
seen in this election show that some predictions
were right and some were wrong. The LDP appears to have benefited from the new system, and
almost all of the candidates feel that campaign
expenses have gone down. However, the number
of "talent" candidates has risen rather than fallen.
Also, though small parties and independents were
thought to have been excluded from the system,
the number of mini -parties increased dramatically
and their electoral performance was consistent with
past elections.
Conclusions
The reVISIon bill of 1982 provides an excellent
example of how parties view election reform proposals from a purely selfish point of view.
Asahi
Shimbun summed up the decision-making process in
retrospect when it said that the debate in the Diet
consisted only of a 5tfscussion of party advantages
and disadvantages.
The newspaper continued
that it would be very hard to separate a political
party's position on an election system from the
advantages ~ disadvantages the party perceives it
will receive.
The newspaper shows how the events surrounding the many electoral revision attempts in
Japan all seem to concur with Duverger's theory
that a party will pursue its self-interest in trying'
to preserve or gain power. The question remains,
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how will this attitude affect future attempts at
election revision in Japan?
Further election revision is unlikely given the positions of the parties
today.
The LDP still desires single-member districts, and unless this proposal is modified in some
way to assure current LDP members that their
seats are safe and to serve the interests of some
of the other opposition parties, the proposal will
end up like its predecessors, the Hatoyama and
Tanaka proposals.
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